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What is envy and how can we define it so as to incorporate the emotion in economic 
models? Through referring on philosophical and psychological researches, this paper 
aims at deriving a stable and concise definition of the emotion of envy. Philosophy 
allows us to define the elements that form envy and to disentangle the latter from other 
emotions.  Researches  on  psychology  help  us  in  understanding  the  affective  and 
behavioural  responses  of  the  emotion.  We  conclude  that  envy  arises  from  any 
unflattering social comparison that threatens individual self-evaluation and includes a 
depressive and a hostile dimension. We also discuss whether the behaviour induced by 
envy results in destructive or in emulative actions. We will disentangle the elements 
that  might  explain  why  envy  does  not  always  exert  the  subject  to  adopt  a  hostile 
attitude toward the envied. 
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Theodore Roosevelt claims that “Probably the greatest harm done by vast wealth is the harm that we 
of moderate means do ourselves when we let the vices of envy and hatred enter deep into our own 
natures”. By these lines, the former President of the United States underlines that envy is an obstacle 
to the good working of modern societies. In line with the latter many scholars emphasize on the 
danger of that emotion. Belshaw (1955) and Mui (1995) stress the economic ravages incurred by 
envy  that can  refrain economic  activities.  More  precisely,  they  refer to  the  emotion of  envy  to 
explain why agents (e.g. persons, group of persons or firms) are reluctant to introduce innovation. 
According to them, agents renounce to innovate because they fear that by innovating they arise envy 
within non-innovating agents which can push the latter to attack them. Rawls (1971) is so afraid of 
envy that his theory of justice relies on the assumption that individuals are born without envy. More 
recently  Zizzo  and  Oswald  (2001)  suggest  that,  motivated  by  envy,  a  great  majority  of  subjects 
choose to destroy others’ incomes even by incurring a personal cost. Beckman et al. (2002) point out 
the invasiveness of envy in decisions involving Pareto efficiency and convey that envy is a powerful 
micro-motivation. Why such a fear about envy? 
The emotion both fascinates and frightens scholars. Envy fascinates because it is mostly inherent to 
human nature and one of the most powerful emotion leading to behaviour. Envy is an omnipresent 
emotion rendering it very difficult to cope with: it is one of the very first emotion that children are 
prone  to  experience  inside  the  core  of  their,  even  protective,  family.
2  Schoeck  (1969)  also 
emphasizes on the pervasive character of envy by making references to various cultures. The author 
underlines that whereas we do not find in every culture concepts such as love, hope or justice; every 
civilization, even very primitive ones, have implemented one or more spe cifics terms in order to 
represent the person who is distressed by the others’ members possessions which he lacks and who 
desire to see these desired attributes destroyed without obtaining it. Furthermore every culture has 
implemented devices made of norms and rituals in order to prevent envious feelings and to protect 
oneself against envious persons. Foster (1972) also supports this claim and tries to distinguish the 
different behaviours implemented by societies so as to cope with envy. Nevertheless, at the same 
time, the emotion embodies a threatening aspect: consumed by envy, the subject is exerted to 
engage in an hostile attitude aiming at harming others’ desired situations even at his own expense. 
Envy is considered as a dangerous emotion that may drive to dramatic issues such as violent acts, 
aggressions or even crimes (Glick, 2002; Schoeck, 1969). In addition, envy is considered as a negative 
                                                           




emotion (e.g. the Bible considers envy as one of the Sevens Sins) and thus socially condemned and 
highly refrained in almost all societies.   
The  invasive  character  and  the  negative  consequences  of  envy  are  responsible  for  captivating 
economists who quickly take an interest in that emotion. Envy made its debut in economics analyses 
through normative economics. Normative economists refer to envy in order to implement a concept 
which fulfils two joint objectives: to discriminate among all Pareto equilibria and to include a justice 
criterium. Tinbergen (1956) is among the first in attempting to introduce envy in economics by 
emphasizing the good way of living in a society in which envy was excluded. Then Foley (1967) offers 
the first lines presupposing the introduction of the “envy-free” concept. He writes “An allocation is 
equitable if and only if each person in the society prefers his consumption bundle to the consumption 
bundle of every other person in the society” (p. 74). By writing these lines, the author highlights two 
key elements in the economic perspective of envy (economic envy afterwards). First, this definition 
implements a condition for economic envy to arise: the social comparison. Indeed economic envy 
can only arise if some agent i compares his situation to the situation of another agent j (i ≠ j). Then 
economic envy appears only when social comparisons reveal some disadvantageous inequality: agent 
j’s situation overshadows agent i’s situation. To summarize subjects might be willing to enjoy having 
what others possess and being in others’ shoes. If someone prefers other’s situation to his own and 
he’s willing to exchange his situation with the other agent’s situation then economic envy is present 
and the situation is considered as unfair. Hence economic envy is apprehended as being an obstacle 
to the implementation of justice.
3 
Albeit envy has been the  object of several intense debates among normative economists, all 
definitions offered to model envy include at least two elements: social comparison and inferiority.
4 
Nevertheless  all  concepts  proposed  to  model  envy  consider  the  latter  under  a  technique 
configuration and conceive it under a linear perspective, i.e. excluding all the complexity and the 
protean character of the emotion which renders envy so interesting. Economic envy is free of any 
feelings or affective states and so suffers from not being di fferentiated from covetousness or 
resentment. Economic envy is ought to arise from any disadvantageous inequality between two 
agents, without making any reference to who are the agents and whether they share or no common 
characteristics. Then as economic envy is defined as a reaction to a deviation from equality, the latter 
is ought to be reduced and even erased only by restoring equality.  Kolm (1995) writes: “Equality 
prevents  envy”  (p.  66).  Besides  economists  have  different  positions  concerning  the  behaviour 
resulting from the experience of envy. On the one hand some economists consider that envy may 
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serve as a motivating force and exert the subject to make additional efforts so as to improve his 
position  (Grolleau  et  al., 2010;  Marglin,  2002).  On  the  other  hand,  scholars  consider  the  action 
resulting from envy as resolutely destructive, i.e. exerting the subject to damage others’ position 
(Beckman et al., 2002; Rawls, 1971; Zizzo and Oswald, 2001; Zizzo, 2008). 
There still is a remaining question: What is envy? A basic and natural need? A situation in which you 
see something in someone’s hands and desire it? A kind of rancour in front of someone’s success or 
advantage? These are the most probable definitions people would give you if you ask them to define 
envy.  This  illustrates  how  difficult  is  to  define  envy  and  to  recognize  the  latter.  Then  several 
questions can also be addressed: Can envy arises without social comparisons? Can any unfavourable 
social comparisons generate envy? What is the connection between inequality and the emotion? 
How can we reduce envy? Is envy associated to hostility? Can we remove the hostility from envious 
episodes? Through this paper, we find answers to these questions.  
We aim at sketching the emotion of envy. What is envy and how can we identify the emotion? More 
precisely, the paper’s objective is to refer to researches made on the emotion so as to derive a stable 
and concise definition of envy. Offering a concise definition of envy is a particularly relevant issue in 
economics. As mentioned above, economics are interested in the emotion in many aspects (e.g. 
when defining allocations of bundles, when implementing contribution mechanisms to public goods 
or in principal-agents relations). Then a concise definition of envy would help economists to develop 
their  understanding  of  the  emotion  so  as  to  improve  the  relevance  of  economic  models,  to 
implement devices to capture the emotion and to investigate its importance in economic decisions. 
To fulfil our objective we rely both on philosophy and on psychology and we face perspectives of 
both disciplines on envy. In other words: how philosophers and psychologists define envy, how do 
they differentiate envy from other emotions or considerations and how do they explain some aspects 
of the emotion (e.g. the action resulting from the emotion, the relationship between inequalities and 
the intensity of envy...)? 
As mentioned above, envy has attracted the attention of several authors. As a consequence several 
papers relative to envy can be signalled. Nevertheless if these papers concerns different aspects of 
the emotion of envy no paper search at building a bridge from philosophy to psychology in the study 
of envy. Schoeck (1969) and Foster (1972) stress the sociological aspect of envy, Smith and Kim 
(2007) examine the psychological foundation of envy, Micelli and Castelfranchi (2007) insist on the 
cognitive aspect of envy and This Saint-Jean (2006), by referring to several philosophers, point out 




This paper consists in two distinct sections. In the first section, we aim at sketching envy from a 
philosophical perspective. To fulfil that purpose we refer on three major philosophers: Aristotle, 
David  Hume  and  Aaron  Ben  Ze'ev.  Through  this  section,  we  will  observe  the  consensus  and 
disagreements concerning the definition of the emotion among philosophers. They all consider envy 
as  an  unpleasant  emotion  characterised  by  feeling  sad  or  bothered  at  the  sight  of  someone’s 
advantage or good fortune. They also presuppose a negative connection between social distance and 
the intensity of envy and agree upon the absence of any concerns for equality in envy. But they do 
not all reach a consensus when disentangling envy from resentment and when defining the action 
resulting from the emotion. 
Through a second section, we will complete this definition by referring to psychological researches 
on envy. Psychologists offer a qualitative description of the emotion, i.e. they focus more on the 
experiential consequences of envy. They also use investigative methods that help in identifying the 
importance of several ingredients in envy. With regard to their results we will conclude that envy is a 
complex emotion mainly made of two affective components: a depressive and a hostile component. 
We will also quote several psychological researches concerning the hostility included in envy and 
point out the importance of two notions in modulating the intensity of envy: perceived control and 
perceived injustice. 
2. The Philosophy of envy 
   
Through this section, we aim at reporting how philosophers describe the emotion of envy. Although 
several philosophers devoted their work studying this complex emotion (Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel 
Kant, Adam Smith, Sören Kierkegaard…) we limit our analysis to three major authors: Aristotle, David 
Hume  and  Aaron  Ben  Ze’ev.  All  quoted  authors  had  and  still  have  a  considerable  influence  in 
economic analysis and thought. Besides they all spend much attention to the study of emotions and 
more particularly on envy.  
We choose not to expand our analysis to other authors for three main reasons. First, the paper’s 
purpose is not to draw an exhaustive review of the philosophical researches about envy. As former 
papers have already mentioned the works of several philosophers concerning envy (D’Arms and Kerr, 
2008; Shoeck, 1969; This-Saint-Jean, 2006), an extensive review of the philosophical literature on 
envy  would  be  inappropriate.  Through  this  section,  we  aim  at  underlining  the  philosophical 
consensus and antagonisms concerning the definition of envy. To point out these issues, we choose 




emotion. The paper tries to shed light on how the emotion of envy can be captured by economists to 
develop  their  analyses.  Second,  one  will  observe  that  there  is  not  a  great  antagonism  among 
philosophers on what envy is. At the end of the first section, the reader will observe that there seems 
to be a consensus on the definition of envy although some points are still the object of philosophical 
debates.  Again  it  would  be  inappropriate  to  note  all  philosophical  researches  about  envy. 
Furthermore, by referring to these philosophers, we cover a great period which allows the reader to 
have a general view on how the study of envy has evolved. Finally, one could argue that our selection 
of authors was made in order to shed light on specific features of envy. The results brought in this 
paper can partly answer to this critic.  
As we will convey, envy is a dyadic emotion. For a convenient reading we will use the following 
terms:  “subject”,  “rival”  and  “desired  attribute”.  We  will  refer  to  the  term  “subject”  so  as  to 
represent the person consumed by envy. The term “rival” will denote the target of the subject’s 
envy. The “rival” can be constituted by a single person or a group of persons. Finally the term 
“desired attribute” catches the good the subject desires but lacks whereas the rival possesses. The 
desired attribute can be a material good (i.e. car, house) or immaterial one (i.e. success, quality, 
personality trait, physical trait…).  
This section is organised as follows. First we refer to Aristotle’s works on envy and detail his writings. 
Then we focus on the perspective adopted by David Hume when describing envy. After presenting 
how Aaron Ben Ze'ev sketches the social emotion, we will close this section with a partial conclusion.  
a.  Aristotle (384-324 BC) 
 
Aristotle presents social comparisons as the core of envy: without comparisons no envy can arise. 
The  philosopher  emphasizes  the  importance  of  social  comparisons  in  generating  several  major 
emotions (e.g. envy, emulation, pity). He considers social comparisons as part of human nature.  
According to Aristotle, not every social comparison is expected to trigger envious feelings. Indeed 
social comparisons can lead to different results and diagnostics. On the one hand, social comparisons 
can reveal one’s own superiority (e.g. when one is performing better than others or when one is 
better endowed than others). On the other hand, social comparisons can give light to one’s own 
inferiority (e.g. when one is less performing than others or when one is worst-off than others). In that  
latter  case,  social  comparisons  have  negative  experiential  consequences  and  generate  pain  or 
sadness.  Aristotle  specifies  that  only  unflattering  social  comparisons  can  generate  envy.  Hence 




[envy] also is a disturbing pain excited by the prosperity of others” (Rhetoric, Book. II, Chap. IX, 
1386b). Envy is focused on the rival’s situation who possesses an attribute the subject lacks. The 
possession of that desired attribute confers to the rival an advantage that overshadows the subject’s 
situation. The rival’s advantage can be pictured as a reminder of the subject’s inferiority. This last 
point is painfully experienced by the subject and is the source of envy. We quote: “We also envy 
those whose possession of or success in a thing is a reproach to us;  (...); for it is clear that is our own 
fault we have missed the good thing in question; this annoys us, and excites envy in us” (Rhetoric, 
Book. II, Chap. X, 1388a). Whereas envy appears in situations of inferiority, individuals enjoying a 
superior position are not liberated from envious feelings. Aristotle also argues that envy can be 
directed upward (e.g. inferiors envy superiors for the superior position) or downward (e.g. superiors 
can envy inferiors for their relative superiority in a specific domain such as youth, success, beauty…). 
Rather than suggesting a general inferiority, Aristotle argues that envy arises from relative inferiority, 
i.e. inferiority in a specific attribute or domain.  
Following Aristotle it seems very important, in order to generate envy, that both the envier and the 
rival have a certain relationship and share some similarities. Similarity is considered according to 
Aristotle as an important element in the envy process: a subject is unlikely to envy a perfect stranger. 
The philosopher details:  “We envy those who are near us in time, place, age or reputation” (Rhetoric, 
Book. II, Chap. X, 1388a). Aristotle goes beyond and, in order to highlight the importance of similarity 
in envy, introduces the notion of “equals”. He adds: “we feel it *envy+ towards our equals (…).We 
shall feel it [envy] if we have, or think we have, equals; and by ‘equals’ I mean equals in birth, 
relationship, age, disposition, distinction, or wealth” (Rhetoric, Book. II, Chap. X, 1387b).  
The proximity is also an important condition in the envy process. Proximity helps in modulating the 
intensity of envy. The concept of proximity refers to the difference between the subject’s situation 
(or position) and the rival’s one. Aristotle assumes a negative and linear correlation between the 
intensity of envy and the subject-object distance.  We underline: “We envy those who are near us, in 
time, place, age, or reputation (…) - we do not compete with men who lived a hundred centuries ago, 
or those not yet born, or the dead, or those who dwell near the Pillars of Hercules, or those whom, in 
our opinion or that of others, we take to be far below us or far above us” (Rhetoric, Book. II, Chapter 
X, 1388a). The philosopher assumes that when high differences prevail between two subjects, the 
condition of proximity is far from being fulfilled and thus envy is less plausible to arise. Conversely 
when differences between two subjects are low, proximity is high that renders social comparisons 




Aristotle states a list of person susceptible to experience envious feelings: ambitious men, small-
minded men, competitive persons or persons who possess what we had in our possession (youth, 
beauty)… He also indicates which goods are more prone to generate envious feelings. We underline: 
“The deeds or possessions which arouse the love of reputation and honour and the desire for fame, 
and the various gifts of fortune, are almost all subject to envy; and particularly if we desire the thing 
ourselves, or think we are entitled to it, or if having it puts us a little above others, or not having it a 
little below them” (Rhetoric, Book. II, Chap. X, 1388a). Relying on these lines, we can observe that the 
notion of competition seems to attract a great importance in the presence and intensity of envy. 
Indeed envy seems to be more present and experienced more intensively in competitive settings. All 
ingredients  required  to  trigger  envy  are  gathered  in  competitive  settings:  at  least  two  persons 
sharing similar characteristics and objectives, and one good whose provision is limited and whose 
property  confers  to  its  owner  an  advantage  over  the  others.  The  philosopher  emphasizes  the 
important aspect of competition in envy by the mean of the following lines: “we compete with those 
who follow the same ends as ourselves: we compete with our rivals in sport or in love, and generally 
with those who are after the same things; and it is therefore these whom we are bound to envy 
beyond all others” (Rhetoric, Book. II, Chap. X, 1388a). 
When Aristotle pictures envy, one can observe that the notion of pain is omnipresent. While defining 
envy, the latter writes: “Envy is a disturbing pain” (Rhetoric, Book. II, Chap. IX, 1386b) or “Envy is 
pain”  (Rhetoric,  Book.  II,  Chap.  X,  1387b).  Pain  is  the  experiential  consequence  of  the  inferior 
situation  in  which  the  subject  is  placed  in.  According  to  the  philosopher,  pain  might  also  be 
generated by the envier to the rival. For Aristotle, it seems obvious that the emotion of envy exerts 
an influence on the envier’s behaviour. Envy induces the subject to undertake an action aiming at 
ceasing  the  painful  and  unpleasant  situation  of  inferiority.  Aristotle  considers  that  the  action 
resulting from envious feelings is destructive by nature. Indeed, consumed by envy, the subject might 
be  willing  to  remove  the  rival’s  advantage  rather  than  obtaining  the  desired  attribute.  This 
destructive decision enables the envier to put an end to his inferiority. Aristotle writes: “(...) envy 
makes us take steps to stop our neighbour having them [desired attribute]” (Rhetoric, Book. II, Chap. 
XI, 1388a).  
Aristotle uses the action resulting from envy to differentiate envy from emulation. On the one hand, 
these  two  emotions  share  common  characteristics  that  may  lead  to  confusion:  both  arise  from 
unfavourable  social  comparisons,  require  proximity  and  similarity  to  appear  and  are  painful 
experiences. He writes: “Emulation is pain caused by seeing the presence, in persons whose nature is 
like our own, of good things that are highly valued and are possible for ourselves to acquire; but it is 




Book. II, Chap. XI, 1388a). On the other hand, Aristotle insists on the importance of distinguishing 
these two emotional episodes: they lead to different actions that have very different consequences. 
Aristotle  praises  emulation  considering  it  as  a  positive  emotion  leading  to  constructive  actions. 
Conversely he apprehends envy as a negative emotion driving to destructive decisions and thus 
condemns it. He explains: “Emulation makes us take steps to secure the good things in question, envy 
makes us take steps to stop our neighbour having them” (Rhetoric, Book. II, Chap. XI, 1388a). The 
latter follows with: “It [emulation] is therefore a good feeling felt by good persons, whereas envy is a 
bad feeling felt by bad persons” (Rhetoric, Book. II, Chap. XI, 1388a). He adds: “Emulation must 
therefore tend to be felt by persons who believe themselves to deserve certain good things that they 
have not got, it being understood that no one aspires to things which appear impossible” (Rhetoric, 
Book. II, Chap. XI, 1388b). Through these last lines, Aristotle suggests that the (perceived) possibility 
for the subject to obtain the desired attribute modulates whether envy or emulation appears. The 
subject  is  more  likely  to  experience  emulation  if  the  latter  believes  he  can  obtain  the  desired 
attribute by implementing additional efforts. On the opposite, if the subject believes the desired 
attribute to be out of his range then envy is more plausible to arise rather than emulation.  
Finally,  Aristotle  distinguishes  envy  from  indignation.  Again  these  emotions  share  very  similar 
characteristics: both result from situations of inferiority, might induce the subject to engage action 
and are painful experiences. To disentangle these emotions, the philosopher refers to the notion of 
desert. Indignation concerns undeserved situations of inferiority whereas envy is based on deserved 
inferiority. Aristotle details that: “Indignation is pain caused by the sight of undeserved good fortune” 
(Rhetoric, Book. II, Chap. IX, 1387a). He adds: “envy it closely akin to indignation, or even the same 
thing. But it is not the same. It is true that it also is a disturbing pain excited by the prosperity of 
others. But it is excited not by the prosperity of the undeserving but by that of people who are like us 
or equal with us. The two feelings have this in common, that they must be due not to some untoward 
thing being likely to befall ourselves, but only to what is happening to our neighbour” (Rhetoric, Book. 
II, Chap. IX, 1386b). Hence the inferiority has to be deserved in order to generate envious feelings. If 
the  situation  of  inferiority  the  subject  is  placed  in  is  undeserved,  the  subject  is  more  likely  to 
experience indignation rather than envy. Whereas enviers might claim their situation to be unjust, 
Aristotle considers such claims as attempts to legitimize a socially condemned attitude. Aristotle 
writes about envy and indignation: “the man who is characterized by righteous indignation is pained 
at undeserved good fortune, the envious man, going beyond him, is pained at all good fortune” 
(Nicomachean Ethics, Book. II, Chap. VII, 1108b).  
Although Aristotle does not precise the nature of the relation between envy and equity, the emotion 




at establishing a situation of non-inferiority rather than a situation of equality. Indeed, the action 
envy leads to aims at removing the desired attribute from the rival’s hands rather than obtaining it. 
According to the philosopher, envy does not focus on equality but rather on the rival’s situation, i.e. 
on a relative inferiority.  
b.  David Hume (1711-1776) 
 
The Scottish philosopher emphasizes the major role of emotions in human decisions. The latter does 
not assume that individuals’ decisions rely exclusively on rationality. Hume believes that individual 
behaviour is influenced by external factors such as impressions or passions (i.e. emotions). He writes: 
“So little are men govern’d by reason in their sentiments and opinions, that they always judge more 
of objects by comparison than from their intrinsic worth and value” (A Treatise of Human Nature, 
Part. II, Sect. VIII, p. 254). Hume devoted much of his work (particularly Dissertation on the Passions 
and A Treatise of Human Nature) to the importance of emotions in human nature and behaviour. The 
philosopher defines passions as: “Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we 
may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, 
as they make their first appearance in the soul” (A Treatise of Human Nature, Part. I, Sect. I, p. 13). 
Hume defines two different types of passions: direct and indirect ones. Both rely on pleasure and 
pain but direct passions are directly experienced from good and evil. Whereas Hume does not offer a 
strong justification for this classification and distinction between direct and indirect passions he 
provides a short list. Hume declares: “When we take a survey of the passions, there occurs a division 
of them into direct and indirect. By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good 
or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such as proceed from the same principles, but by the 
conjunction of other qualities. (…)I can only observe in general, that under the indirect passions I 
comprehend pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their 
dependants.  And  under  the  direct  passions,  desire,  aversion,  grief,  joy,  hope,  fear,  despair  and 
security” (A Treatise of Human Nature, Part. I, Sect. I, p. 190). Then according to Hume, envy belongs 
to the family of indirect passions.  
 
Hume sketches envy as arising from social comparisons and more precisely from social diagnostics 
one derives from these comparisons. We underline: “The comparison of ourselves with others seems 
to be the source of envy and malice” (Dissertation on the Passions, Sect. III, p.157). The philosopher 
emphasizes the pervasive character of social comparisons in human behaviour by claiming “The 
comparison is obvious and natural: the imagination finds it in the very subjects” (A Treatise of Human 




explained by the key role they have in determining and maintaining a person’s self-esteem. We 
quote:  “Comparison  is  in  every  case  a  sure  method  of  augmenting  our  esteem  of  anything”  (A 
Treatise of Human Nature, Part. I, Sect. X, p. 217). Then social comparisons leading to favourable 
diagnostics  have  a  positive  impact  on  self-esteem  whereas  social  comparisons  leading  to 
unfavourable diagnostics have negative consequences on self-esteem. Only that latter case is ought 
to generate envy. 
 
According to Hume, envy is a passion that stems from situations of inferiority. He notes: “envy arises 
from a superiority in others” (Dissertation on the Passions, Sect. IV, p.159). Hence envy is directed 
upward: we envy those who enjoy a superior position. Nevertheless Hume defines a sort of envy 
directed downward. Indeed it is possible for superiors to envy persons from inferior position. An 
agent may envy inferiors that are improving their position. By improving their position, inferiors 
threaten the agent’s superiority and they can even overshadow the agent by reversing roles. Hence 
Hume introduces a sort of envy that could be pictured as an anticipation of an expected envy, i.e. 
one may envy inferiors because they could by improving their position become superior and one 
would experience envy directed at them. Hume explains: “Hence arises that species of envy, which 
men feel, when they perceive their inferiors approaching or overtaking them in the pursuit of glory or 
happiness. In this envy we may see the effects of comparison twice repeated. A man, who compares 
himself to his inferior, receives a pleasure from the comparison: And when the inferiority decreases by 
the elevation of the inferior, what shou’d only have been a decrease of pleasure, becomes a real pain, 
by a new comparison with its preceding condition” (A Treatise of Human Nature, Part. II, Sect. VIII, p. 
257). Hume relates envy with pain for the envier: the latter suffers from inferiority feelings generated 
by unflattering social comparisons. Hence the philosopher underlines the unpleasant experience of 
envious episodes affecting negatively individual self-esteem. Hume considers that envy stems from 
social comparisons damaging individual self-esteem. 
 
Hume  identifies  a  second  condition  to  arise  envy:  proximity.  Indeed,  the  distance  between  the 
subject and the rival (e.g. the subject-object gap) is important to generate envious feelings. In line 
with Aristotle, Hume assumes a linear and negative correlation between the intensity of envy and the 
subject-object distance. If the subject-object gap is too important, envy is less likely to appear or will 
not be intense. On the contrary when the subject object gap is low, then envy is highly present and 
very intense. We underline: “’tis not the great disproportion betwixt ourself and another, which 
produces it [envy]; but on the contrary, our proximity” (A Treatise of Human Nature, Part. I, Sect. VIII, 
p. 257). He details: “*Envy arises from a superiority in others; but it is observable, that it is not the 




great disproportion cuts off the relation of the ideas, and either keeps us from comparing ourselves 
with what is remote from us, or diminishes the effects of the comparison (…). All these differences, if 
they do not prevent, at least weaken the comparison, and consequently the passion” (Dissertation on 
the Passions, Sect. IV, p. 159). Hume supplies various examples to illustrate his claim: “A common 
soldier bears no such envy to his general as to his sergeant or corporal” (A Treatise of Human Nature, 
Part. I, Sect. VIII, p. 257).  
 
Nevertheless inferiority and proximity are not sufficient conditions for envy to arise. Hume highlights 
another condition: similarity. Indeed in order to generate envious feelings, the subject and the rival 
must share similar characteristics. He writes: “Resemblance and proximity always produce a relation 
of ideas; and where you destroy these ties, however other accidents may bring two ideas together; as 
they have no bond or connecting quality to join them in the imagination; ’tis impossible they can 
remain long united, or have any considerable influence on each other” (A Treatise of Human Nature, 
Part. I, Sect. VIII, p. 257).  Hence envy is prone to appear if both the subject and the rival share 
common  characteristics:  they  have  the  same  profession,  they  compete  for  the  same  prize…  In 
absence of any similarity, social comparisons are less self-relevant, have less incidence on individual 
self-esteem and have less emotional impact. As a consequence they are less prone to generate 
emotions and envy. We quote: “(…) the proximity in the degree of merit is not alone sufficient to give 
rise to envy, but must be assisted by other relations. A poet is not apt to envy a philosopher, or a poet 
of a different kind, of a different nation, or of a different age. All these differences prevent or weaken 
the comparison, and consequently the passion” (A Treatise of Human Nature, Part. I, Sect. VIII, p. 
257). The philosopher directly connects the relevance of social comparisons and emotional intensity. 
By  highlighting  the  importance  of  similarity  in  the  envy-process,  Hume  directly  connects  the 
relevance  of  social  comparisons  with  emotional  intensity.  If  social  comparisons  concern  similar 
subjects then they are considered, from the subject’s point of view, as relevant (i.e. the subject 
associates much importance to these social comparisons). If social comparisons are relevant then 
they can alter individual self-evaluation (if they are unflattering) and generate envy. 
 
Concerning any action motivated by envy, Hume lacks clarity. Whereas the philosopher pictures envy 
as  an  unpleasant  and  painful  experience,  he  does  not  precise  whether  the  individual  might  be 
exerted to engage a specific action aiming at ceasing his pain. Besides he does not offer a clear 
conclusion on the nature of the action resulting from envious feelings. Nevertheless, it seems that 
Hume considers that envy does not include a negative action aiming at hurting the rival. According to 
the philosopher, the action induced by envious feelings might be considered as the key point to 




envy. Concerning some points, the definition of envy supplied by Hume remains vague: the latter 
does not offer a distinction between envy and indignation nor between envy and emulation and does 
not precise whether envy includes a concern for equality. 
 
Several notions are linked to envy. Hume connects envy with anger and malice when describing the 
circle of passions. The relation between envy and anger is somewhat complex. Anger is an emotion 
that can generate envious feelings. Nevertheless episodes of envy can induce anger. Hume writes: 
“Envy is naturally accompanied with anger or ill-will” (A Dissertation on the Passions, Sect. III, p.157). 
Conversely the relation between envy and malice is clearer: malice is triggered by envy. Hume, while 
describing part of the circle of passions, declares: “Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger 
to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be compleated” (A Treatise of 
Human Nature, Part. I, Sect. IV, p. 195). Hume very often associates envy with malice. In A Treatise of 
Human  Nature,  the  latter  devotes  an  entire  section  on  defining  and  disentangling  these  two 
emotions (Book II, Part. II, Sect. VIII). On the one hand these emotions share similar characteristics: 
both emotions are social ones (i.e. generated by social comparisons) and are associated with pain. 
On the other hand, malice is associated with a desire to produce pain to the rival whereas envy does 
not involve such desire. Hence Hume disentangles these emotions by their origin. Malice arises from 
an enjoyment at seeing others suffering whereas envy is triggered by the displeasure at seeing others 
happy and successful. Hume argues that “The only difference betwixt these passions lies in this, that 
envy is excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison diminishes our idea of 
our own: Whereas malice is the unprovok’d desire of producing evil to another, in order to reap a 
pleasure from the comparison” (A Treatise of Human Nature, Part. II, Sect. VIII, p. 256).  
c.  Aaron Ben Ze’ev (1949- ) 
 
In line with Aristotle and Hume, Ben Ze'ev places social comparisons at the core of envy. Without 
social  comparisons  no  envy  can  arise.  Ben  Ze'ev  pictures  envy  as  an  emotional  reaction  to  any 
damage  (potential  or  real)  inflicted  on  individual  self-evaluation.  The  philosopher  highlights  the 
pervasive character of comparisons and their importance in one’s self-evaluation. He writes: “People 
compare themselves with others in order to reduce uncertainty about themselves and maintain or 
enhance self-esteem” (1992, p. 554). He follows with: “An unfavorable comparison often leads to 
envy” (1992, p. 554).  
According to the philosopher, inferiority and desert are the two elements of central concern in the 




trigger envy. Inferiority appears clearly from the definition offered by the philosopher. The latter 
sketches  envy  as  a  form  of  sadness  triggered  in  situations  in  which  one  perceives  his  relative 
inferiority. He notes: “envy may be characterized as a negative attitude toward another person’s 
superiority and the desire to gain what this person possesses” (1992, p. 552). Hence one envies those 
who enjoy some attribute one does not possess and whose possessions give them an advantage over 
the latter. The philosopher notes: “The person we envy has personal attributes (such as beauty, 
patience, or intelligence), possessions (such as car) or positions (being the boss) that we lack but 
desire” (2000, p. 282).  
Ben Ze’ev underlines that envy arises in every unflattering social comparison that threatens one self-
evaluation. This condition suggests that not every situation of inferiority is expected to trigger envy. 
We  quote:  “We  compare  ourselves  with  people  whom  we  consider  to  occupy  an  approximately 
similar position or possess similar ability. We tend to exclude from our reference group people who 
appear definitely superior or inferior to us as well as those belonging to irrelevant domains” (1992, p. 
559). Thus, for envy to arise, unflattering social comparisons have to gather two elements. First, the 
comparison has to be self-relevant, i.e. it must concern a good or a domain very important with self-
accomplishment and self-evaluation. Social comparisons can reveal one’s relative inferiority but if the 
inferiority concerns an attribute that has no importance to our eyes then envy is very unlikely to 
appear (see below). Ben Ze'ev insists on the self-relevance of the desired attribute: “(…)when the 
good fortune is relevant, our self-esteem and the evaluation of ourselves by others is threatened and 
envy arises” (2000, p. 286). The self-relevance condition implies that one compares his situation to 
the one of similar subjects (e.g. similar characteristics, aspirations and status). The philosopher also 
underlines that inferiority is partial rather than general, i.e. it concerns a sole attribute or trait. He 
writes: “We may envy only one aspect of another person, yet continue to consider ourselves superior 
in general” (2000, p. 286).  Secondly, Ben Ze'ev insists on the importance of similarity and proximity: 
social comparisons have to concern similar and not too distant subjects. Ben Ze'ev develops: “envy 
seems to be directed at those who are like us or equal to us but are still slightly superior to us” (1992, 
p. 556). The philosopher details: “Envy implies a particular situation worse than that of someone else 
of importance to us.” (1992, p. 559). By these lines, Ben Ze'ev suggests that envy may be directed 
upward (inferiors envy superiors) or downward (superiors envy inferiors for their specific and relative 
inferiority  and  might  consider  themselves  as  inferiors  concerning  a  specific  area).
5  The latter 
emphasizes the importance of proximity by introducing the notion of “neighbourhood envy”. This 
concept implies that one envies those whose position in just above one’s position. We quote: “In 
                                                           
5 The proximity and self-relevance conditions also help in disentangling envy from admiration. According to Ben 
Ze'ev, admiration appears when one observes the good fortunes of individuals far from one or enjoying an 




envy, our attention is focused on those perceived to be immediately above us” (1992, p. 556). To 
illustrate the importance of proximity in generating envy, the philosopher refers to the notion of 
“sense of alteration”. This concept captures the reality of every change perceived by the subject and 
explains why social emotions are always more intense when differences between the subject and the 
rival are slight. When differences are low, the subject will immediately notice every change in the 
rival’s situation. Besides the subject will attach much importance to these slight changes because 
they can alter, even dramatically, the subject’s position (i.e. the subject can even pass to a different 
status: from superior to inferior). Under those circumstances, the sense of alteration is high. On the 
other hand, when differences are high, changes will not affect in a significant way the subject’s 
position and as a consequence are ought to have a slight emotional impact. The sense of alteration is 
thus low. Ben Ze'ev itemizes: “The stronger, or the more real the change, the more intense the 
emotion” (1992, p. 565). This notion explains why envy requires proximity and is more intense in 
small gaps (see below). 
In line with Aristotle, Ben Ze'ev points out the omnipresence of envy in competition. He states that 
competition is an environment in which all ingredients required to arise envy are gathered: similarity 
between competitors, proximity, self-relevance of the desired attribute (e.g. object of competition), 
one good whose access is limited and whose property is exclusive and thus confers an advantage to 
who possess it.  
As mentioned previously, the second key element in the definition of envy is desert. In line with 
Aristotle and Hume, Ben Ze'ev refers to the notion of desert in order to disentangle envy from 
indignation. Both include sadness and pain at the sight of others’ advantage except that indignation 
is socially accepted and considered as a legitimized attitude whereas envy is socially condemned and 
highly refrained. Relying on Ben Ze'ev’ lines, indignation concerns undeserved situations of inferiority 
whereas envy appears in deserved situations of inferiority. The philosopher defines indignation as an 
“emotional  protest  against  what  is  perceived  as  morally  unjust”  (1992,  p.553).  Whereas  enviers 
might  claim  that  their situation  is  undeserved,  this  claim  remains  not  justified  and  is  a  rational 
attempt to justify their envy. We underline: “Envy involves the subject's relative inferiority and the 
belief  that  this  deprivation  is  undeserved”  (1992,  p.  564).    Conversely  to  previous  quoted 
philosophers,  Ben  Ze’ev  goes  beyond  in  disentangling  envy  from  indignation.  He  explains  that 
referring to the concept of desert is not a sufficient condition to disentangle envy from resentment. 
Ben Ze’ev distinguishes desert claims from moral claims. He writes: “Whereas desert claims are 
based  on  the value  of  a person’s  attributes  and  actions,  moral  claims  often refer  to  obligations 
toward other persons”(1992, p. 561). He follows with: “desert claims *…+are often based on one’s 




(or subjective) undeserved situations. Hence someone might considered his situation as undeserved 
because the latter believes his situation to be unfair although his situation is not the result of some 
agent’s deliberate choices or criminal behaviour. On the other hand, moral claims are directed to the 
action or behaviour of some agent (person or creature). Ben Ze’ev writes: “*…+in moral claims the 
agent is a person having some responsibility” (1992, p. 561). He develops: “The desert claims typical 
of envy are personal and only rarely can be satisfied by moral action. Such claims are not considered 
as serious moral claims” (1992, p. 562). To illustrate the difference between desert claims and moral 
claims, let consider two women, Jill and Jane, comparing the beauty of each other. They lead to an 
inevitable conclusion: Jane is more beautiful than Jill. Although beauty is one of the greatest attribute 
subject to envy, if we refer to the concept of desert to disentangle envy from resentment we cannot 
say that Jill might envy Jane for her beauty but rather that Jill experience indignation at being less 
beautiful than Jane. Furthermore, no one can be held responsible for Jill being less beautiful than 
Jane then the situation is undeserved. By using the distinction between desert claims and moral 
claims, Jill may envy Jane for her beauty because Jill’s envy involves a desert claim (she personally 
might believe her situation as unjust) but not a serious moral claim (no one is to blame for her 
inferior beauty). The philosopher concludes by: “Envy is often based on personal, non-moral norms of 
desert, whereas resentment is usually based on societal moral norms of justice” (1992, p. 562).
6 He 
adds: “Envy occurs when the wrongness is related to our inferior situation; resentment occurs when 
wrongdoing is perceived: it conveys an implicit accusation” (2000, p. 285). 
In opposition to Aristotle and Hume, Ben Ze'ev does not assume a linear and negative correlation 
between the intensity of envy and social distance. He rather refers to the notion of reference group 
and  differentiates  two  sorts  of  inequalities:  intragroup  and  intergroup  inequalities.  Intragroup 
inequalities refer to inequalities that are important for one’s self-evaluation (i.e. between similar 
subjects  and  concerning  self-important  attributes).  Conversely  intergroup  inequalities  concern 
inequalities between subjects that are not important for the subject’s self-evaluation (i.e. outside the 
reference group). Whereas Ben Ze'ev assumes that the correlation between social distance and the 
intensity of envy is positive concerning intragroup inequalities, he assumes a negative correlation 
about intergroup inequalities.
7 In other words, one envies more intensively the person occupying the 
top position of his reference group than the person just above  him. Nevertheless outside the 
reference group, one envies more intensively those who are close to them than those who are far 
from them. We underline: “If we take the gap and relevancy as constant, we should expect a more or 
less positive correlation between similarity and the intensity of envy. A more complex correlation is 
                                                           
6 Ben Ze'ev associates indignation and resentment and uses these terms interchangeably. 




that between the intensity of envy and the subject-object gap (given that relevancy and similarity are 
significant and constant). Without drawing the precise lines of this correlation, I may say that the 
curve depicting it is somewhat similar to a bellshaped curve. Up to a certain width, envy is quite low. 
From  this  point  the  gap  begins  to  be  large  enough  to  generate  significant  emotional  impact. 
Immediately beyond this point there is a sharp increase in the intensity of envy. There is also a point 
of maximal envy after which a widening of the gap will reduce envy. The existence of such a point is 
illustrated by the fact that we are less envious of an increase in the income of rich people than of a 
corresponding increase in the income of people who are richer than us but poorer than the rich man. 
In very great gaps an additional increase will not affect the intensity of the subject's envy. In any case, 
for most people some level of envy still exists on any positive level of the gap” (1992, p. 573). 
As presented above, Ben Ze'ev defines envy as a unpleasant form of desire for obtaining some 
desired attribute others enjoy. This desire may induce the subject to make an action so as to leave 
his inferior situation. In opposition with Aristotle, Ben Ze'ev does not reduce envy to an emotion 
leading exclusively into destructive actions. We underline: “We should not reduce envy to hostility, 
however, or vice versa. Envious people dislike their inferior position; they do not necessarily feel 
hostility or dislike toward the envied person” (1992, p. 574). The philosopher claims that, in order to 
get out from his inferior situation, the subject motivated by envy faces two alternatives. On the one 
hand, the subject might be pushed to improve his own position by obtaining the desired attribute. In 
that case, envy would serve as motivating force aiming at increasing the subject’s situation by making 
additional and constructive efforts. On the other hand, the subject might be exerted to reduce the 
rival’s position by removing the desired attribute from the rival’s hands. In that configuration, envy 
would be translated into a hostile and destructive force. Ben Ze'ev considers the destructive action 
resulting from envious feelings as the ugliest form of envy. Ben Ze'ev writes: “It [envy] entails the 
desire  to  improve  the  subject's  personal  lot,  not  concern  for  other  people.  (…).  Furthermore, 
sometimes the envious person wishes to deprive the object of her greater benefits, even if this means 
depriving oneself of some benefits as well” (1992, p. 553). By considering a positive action, Ben Ze'ev 
suggests that envy might involve a desire not only to improve one’s position but also to overpass the 
rival.
8 Ben Ze'ev does not explain why and how envy can change from its emulative form to its 
destructive aspect.  
Ben Ze'ev offers a clear distinction between envy, covetousness and discontent. Covetousness, even 
if it includes a desire for some possession of others, is not characterized by situations of inferiority. It 
                                                           




can appear even if one enjoys a superior position.
9 Discontent is related to a situation one achieves, 
judges  as  wrong  and  believes  that  a  better  alternative  exists.  The  philosopher  writes:  “Unlike 
covetousness and discontent, which are merely concerned with gaining something or achieving a 
certain state, envy is mainly concerned with someone else who has something or is in a certain state” 
(1992, p. 555). 
Finally, Ben Ze'ev discusses an important issue: whether envy includes or not a concern for equality. 
Following the philosopher, envy does not involve any concern for equality. Indeed the envier, by 
improving  his  position  or by  decreasing  the  rival’s one,  is  not  willing to  establish  a  situation of 
equality  but  rather  to  establish  a  situation  of  non-inferiority.  The  envier  focuses  on  his  relative 
situation, i.e. on his relative inferiority rather than on equality. Indeed its focus is relative rather than 
general:  one  does  not  aim  at  being  superior  in  all  domains  but  in  some  specific  and  restricted 
attributes or traits. The philosopher precises that: “it [envy] entails the desire to improve our personal 
lot,  not the  desire  to  improve the well-being  of  other  people” (2000,  p. 283).  To  strengthen  his 
thought, Ben Ze'ev notes: “The central concern in envy is different from the egalitarian moral concern 
that calls for the reduction or even elimination of different inequalities” (1992, p. 575). To support his 
claim, the philosopher explains that if envy involved some concern for equality then envy would not 
appear concerning goods for which equality is unrealizable (beauty, sexual success…). Besides we 
observe very intense envy for these goods. Ben Ze'ev concludes by claiming that: “envy is not a moral 
emotion. Envy differs from the egalitarian moral concern in at least two major ways. First, it involves 
a partial rather than a general concern: the envious person is not concerned with equality as a 
general value; the claim to equality is merely a desire to improve the subject's personal situation and 
thus does not appear when inequality favors the subject. Second, envy also surfaces in cases where 
the demand for equality is unrealizable and has nothing to do with egalitarian moral principles» 
(1992, p. 575). 
d.  Partial conclusion 
 
Through this section, we detail how different philosophers describe the emotion of envy. After these 
descriptions, a consensus obviously emerges on the source of envy: envy stems from unfavourable 
social comparisons. Social comparisons are pictured as deeply rooted in human nature and thus 
almost impossible to cope with. All quoted authors define envy using the concept of inferiority. 
Besides all of them precise that envy concerns partial (or relative) inferiority rather than general 
inferiority (see below). Philosophers also emphasize on the necessity to involve similar and not too 
                                                           




distant subjects in order to generate envy and add that inferiority must concern a self-relevant 
attribute.  Concerning  the distance  between  the  subject  and the  rival  and  the  intensity of  envy, 
Aristotle and Hume assume a negative correlation (i.e. the higher the inequality the more intense 
envy is expected to arise) whereas Ben Ze’ev offers more precision. The latter refers to the concept 
of the reference group and distinguishes intragroup inequalities from intergroup inequalities. Ben 
Ze’ev considers that the relation between the intensity of envy and the subject-object distance is 
positive concerning intragroup inequalities and negative concerning intergroup inequalities. In other 
words, Ben Ze'ev assumes that the higher the intragroup inequality is, the more intense envy is 
expected to be experienced. Conversely, he presupposes that the higher the intergroup inequality is, 
the less intense envy is expected to appear. Then all quoted philosophers sketch envy insisting on its 
unpleasant and often painful experience. Philosophers refer to the notions of pain and sadness when 
picturing the emotion. They all consider envy as a form of sadness when one becomes aware or 
learns  his  relative  inferiority.  Finally,  philosophers  state  that  envy  is  free  of  consideration  for 
equality.  More  precisely  envy  does  not  aim  at  establishing  a  situation  of  equality  but  rather  a 
situation  of  non-inferiority  which  remains  fundamentally  different.  The  emotion  pictured  by 
philosophers indicates that envy implies a partial rather than a general consideration for equality: 
envy  is  ought  to  be  reduced  only  when  the  rival  loses  his  advantage  and  hence  his  relative 
superiority. As a consequence the envier demands equality in order not to be overshadowed by his 
rival’s situation. Besides the person suffering from envy is likely to prefer a situation in which neither 
him nor the rival enjoy the desired attribute to a situation in which both the subject and the rival 
possess it. Hence it seems obvious that envy does not exert the subject to engage in a quest for 
equality but rather to put a stop to one’s inferiority. Furthermore the envier’s demand for equality 
might be considered as a deliberate attempt to legitimize an inappropriate attitude and a socially 
condemned emotion. Would envy be removed of the subject obtains what the rival’s possesses? No 
albeit the subject now receives what he lacked, he still suffer from the rival’s advantage. Imagine that 
Jill envies Jane for her new convertible. Even if Jill buys a similar convertible, her envy would not 
disappear since Jane still overshadows Jill: Jane was the first in having a convertible! 
Nevertheless some aspects of envy divide the philosophers. Not all distinguish envy from indignation. 
Whereas Aristotle and Ben Ze'ev disentangle envy from indignation by referring to the concept of 
desert, Hume does not make such a distinction. Besides, by disentangling moral claims from desert 
claims, Ben Ze'ev offers more precision concerning the differentiation between envy and indignation. 
Desert claims refer to subjective (or perceived) injustices whereas moral claims refer to injustices 
resulting from others’ decisions. Conversely to indignation (or resentment), envy involves desert 




from envy. Aristotle considers envy as leading to a resolutely hostile behaviour, Hume does not state 
about this point and Ben Ze'ev argues that envy can either embody an emulative or a destructive 
aspect.  
To summarize, envy, from a philosophical perspective, can be sketched as a social emotion triggered 
by  unflattering social  comparisons,  resulting  in  a  painful  sadness  at  the  sight  of  others’  relative 
advantage(s) and discharged of any equality concerns. Nevertheless, as pointed with quoted authors, 
some antagonisms are to deplore concerning specific issues: referring to the concept of desert so as 
to disentangle envy from indignation and the action tendency resulting from envy. 
First,  the  differentiation  between  envy  and  indignation  lacks  precision.  Imagine  the  following 
situation. Jill and Jane are both participating in a beauty contest. Both aim at winning the contest (i.e. 
winning the contest is self-relevant for both Jill and Jane). Unfortunately Jill is informed that Jane 
wins the contest at the expense of Jill. Jill is distressed. At the same time, Jill learns that Jane was 
having an affair with the President of the jury. The problem is now the following: is Jill experiencing 
envy or indignation? According to Ben Ze'ev, Jill has a moral complaint: she loosed because Jane 
conspired  in  order  to  win  and  Jill  holds  Jane  for  being  responsible  of  her  failure.  Then  only 
indignation (or resentment) can appear. Although Jane was having an affair with the President of the 
jury, it might not have an incidence on the issue of the beauty contest (or this information can even 
be false). So the moral complaint is subjective rather than objective, and thus Jill might rather be 
envious than indignant. La Caze (2001, 2002) is very sceptical concerning the connection between 
envy and desert. La Caze argues that referring to the notion of desert so as to disentangle envy from 
indignation (and resentment) is too flexible and might lead to wrong interpretations. On the one 
hand, she claims that envy can be experienced toward persons one judges they do not deserve their 
situation. This is particularly the case when envy concerns goods such as beauty, luck or intelligence. 
She writes: “Envy may be based on the judgement that others are unworthy of the success or benefits 
they have gained” (2001, p. 32). On the other hand, she underlines that envy can also be directed 
toward persons that deserve their situation. We quote: “We might also feel envious even when the 
success  is  deserved”  (2001,  p.  32).  La  Caze  offers  to  disentangle  envy  from  resentment  (and 
indignation) by specifying the focus of one’s distress. She defines envy as an emotion arising from the 
awareness of others’ advantages. She precises : “The person who is envious feels uncomfortable in 
some way in the judgements that others are better off than they” (2001, p. 32). She follows with: 
“Envy is a complex of feelings involving the recognition that others have, through luck or either 
deserved or undeserved means, received goods or had successes which are considered desirable” 
(2001, p. 32). As a consequence, according to La Caze, envy is focused on the rival’s situation, or in a 




Conversely, La Caze precises that indignation (and resentment) are related with wrongdoing. She 
details: “Indignation (…) is focused only on the wrongness or undesirability of a state of affairs” 
(2001, p. 32) and “resentment concerns things considered to be wrongs which have been done, or are 
perceived as having been done, to us and others” (p. 32). Then indignation and resentment have a 
different  focus  when  comparing  to  envy:  they  focus  on  how  the  rival  obtains  his  situation  and 
attribute. To conclude, if what bothers the subject is his relative situation (i.e. his inferiority relative 
to his rival) without any reference to whether the situation is wrong or not then envy appears. On 
the opposite, if what bothers the subject is how the rival obtained the situation or the good then 
indignation  (or  resentment)  are  likely  to  appear  rather  than  envy.  If  we  consider  the  previous 
example, then Jill envies Jane because Jill’s distress arises from Jill’s relative inferiority (i.e. Jill looses 
the contest). But if Jill’s distress arises from learning how Jane succeeds in winning the contest, then 
indignation is more likely to arise rather than envy. 
Then the behaviour resulting from envious feelings seems to be the object of controversy. On the 
one hand, some philosophers describe envy as a constructive emotion and underline its emulative 
aspect. On the other hand, several philosophers picture envy as a destructive emotion insisting on its 
ugly side (D’Arms, 2002; D’Arms and Kerr, 2008; Kant, 1986; Thomas Aquinas, 1981). Nevertheless 
Aristotle points out an important aspect in the envy process: the perceived possibility for the subject 
to  attain  the  desired  attribute  or  not.  Aristotle  states  that  if  the  subject  perceives  the  desired 
attribute to be under his range then emulation is more likely to arise whereas if he believes the 
desired attribute to be out of his range then envy is more likely to arise. In other words, if a subject 
faces an unfavourable social comparison, Aristotle assumes that when the desired attribute seems, 
from  the  subject’s  perspective,  attainable  then  the  subject  might  be  more  prone  to  engage  in 
constructive actions rather than in destructive ones. Conversely, when the desired attribute seems, 
from the subject’s perspective, unattainable then the subject is more likely to behave negatively and 
to damage the rival’s situation. 
3. The Psychology of envy. 
 
After providing a philosophical definition of envy, we aim, through this section, at sketching the 
emotion from a qualitative perspective. To fulfil that purpose, we refer on psychological researches 
made on envy and focus on how envy is experienced from the envier’s perspective so as to identify 
the affective components included in any episode of envy. We also refer to psychologists studies on 




destructive actions. The key point in the psychological researches made on envy is the experimental 
approach used to study that emotion. Psychologists are among the first to use investigative methods, 
i.e. to adapt and implement experimental procedures in order to investigate the psychological nature 
and foundations of envy. 
This section is organized as follows. In a first sub-section, we detail how psychologists define envy. 
Then we focus on studies trying to label qualitatively envy. Through a third sub-section, we report 
how psychologists consider the nature of envy and investigate the relation between hostility and 
envy. Again, we will close this section with a partial conclusion.  
 
a.  The psychological definition of envy 
 
Envy has received much attention from psychologists: the emotion appears to be involved in most 
aggressive behaviours (Schoeck, 1969) and observed conflicts (Glick, 2002). Despite the importance 
of the emotion and its invasiveness on human behaviour, psychological researches on envy began 
lately and is on its early stages. The first review of the psychological literature on envy is recent 
(Smith and Kim, 2007) and the interest concerning this emotion is increasing as suggested by the 
recent publication of a book entirely devoted to the emotion (Envy: Theory and Research edited by R. 
Smith in 2009).  
In line with philosophers, psychologists associate the origin of envy in social comparisons and more 
precisely  in  unfavourable  ones.  Farber  (1966)  defines  envy  as  arising  “(…)  from  a  person’s 
apprehension  of  another’s  superiority  and  his  consequent  critical  evaluation  of  himself “(p.  239). 
Smith and Kim (2007) share the same view about envy, they write: “Envy, the unpleasant emotion 
that can arise when we compare unfavourably with others” (p. 46). Social comparisons have a major 
influence on individuals and a key role in self-evaluation and self-esteem (Festinger, 1954; Heider, 
1958; Lockwood and Kunda, 1997; Testa and Major, 1990).
10 Social comparisons contribute to ability 
assessments by allowing individuals to derive a diagnostic and to obtain information  about their 
relative performance and about the ingredients needed to improve one’s performance. But not every 
social comparison affects one’s self-evaluation and self-esteem. As it is impossible for an ordinary 
agent to be the best in all domains, one compares with others not in general aspects but in specific 
aspects or attributes: we define self-relevant domains or attributes. Only social comparisons that 
concern important attributes (from the subject’s perspective) are ought to enhance or to damage 
                                                           
10 Self-evaluation is deeply connected to self-esteem since it is held responsible for determining self-esteem 




one’s  self-evaluation.  Envy  stems  from  unflattering  social  comparisons  that  damage  one’s  self-
evaluation. As envy affects negatively one’s self-evaluation, it also damages one’s self-esteem. 
Psychologists also emphasize on the importance of similarity, proximity and self-relevance in the 
envy process. Smith and Kim (2007) write: “we envy similar others who otherwise enjoy an advantage 
in an area linked to our self-worth” (p. 50). Envy appears when social comparisons involve similar 
subjects, i.e. persons occupying similar positions, characteristics and aspirations (Festinger, 1954; 
Salovey  and  Rodin,  1984;  Schaubroeck  and  Lam,  2004).  Despite  the  great  number  of  social 
comparisons  made  by  individuals,  a  few  number  are  of  interest  to  one’s  eyes.  Indeed  only 
comparisons  with  similar  individuals  will  affect  (whether  positively  or  negatively)  one’s  self-
evaluation and self-esteem and thus can lead to envious feelings. Festinger (1954) precises that: “(…) 
given a range of possible persons for comparison, someone close to one’s own ability or opinion will 
be chosen for comparison” (p. 121). Smith and Kim (2007) specify that only comparisons “with people 
who share comparison-related attributes, such as gender, age, and social class” (p. 50) are prone to 
generate envy. Comparing oneself with individuals far from corresponding to one’s situation will not 
be considered as relevant and, as a consequence, will not affect one’s self-evaluation and will not 
generate envy.  Psychologists offer two explanations for requiring proximity to generate envy. First, 
comparing oneself with similar individuals reduces the number of relevant comparisons but keeps 
offering a great number of opportunities for social comparisons. Second, the condition of social 
proximity allows subjects to derive a diagnostic from social comparisons. An ordinary agent would 
not be able to identify the elements he lacks in order to succeed when comparing to Bill Gates who 
possesses  everything  the  agent  lacks.  Thus  social  proximity  would  enable  us  to  make  a  sort  of 
interesting social comparisons in order to understand why we perform so poorly and in order to 
obtain  precious  information  about  what  is  required  to  perform  better.  To  summarize,  social 
proximity helps social comparisons in building inferences about one self (Festinger, 1954) and allows 
social comparisons to contribute to ability assessments (Collins, 1996; Lockwood and Kunda, 1997). 
Finally, the object of comparison (i.e. desired attribute) has to be self-relevant, i.e. to embody a 
specific  importance  to  one’s  eyes.  It  must  concern  a  domain  very  important  with  self-
accomplishment and self-evaluation (Festinger, 1954; Ortony et al., 1988; Salovey and Rodin, 1984). 
If the desired attribute concerns a domain that does not embody a great importance to our eyes then 
admiration is more likely to arise rather than envy.
11 Giving the omnipresence of social comparisons, 
                                                           
11 Imagine the following situation: whereas Bob finished second last year, this year he aims at winning the 100-
meter-dash  organized  by  his  school.  He  may  envy  John  who  won  the  100-meter-dash  last  year  and  still 
participate but he admires rather than envy Usain Bolt the Olympic winner. Usain Bolt and Bob do not share 
similarities and do not compete in the same category that render social comparisons between Bob and Usain 




one aims at providing a positive image of oneself. To fulfil that objective one needs to perform well 
and, sometimes, even perform better than others. Nevertheless it is impossible for some agent to be 
the best in all domains. Thus individuals personally define domains of self-relevance and implement 
efforts  (whether  constructive  or  destructive)  to  outperform  others  in  those  restricted  and  very 
specific domains.  
The importance of similarity and self-relevance in the envy process can be perfectly illustrated by the 
study by Schaubroeck and Lam (2004). The authors study how bank tellers, expecting for a job 
promotion, perceive their co-workers. The authors ask them to answer to a questionnaire aiming at 
evaluating  the  perceived  similarity  of  subjects,  the  expected  promotions,  subjects’  job 
performance…
12 The authors observe that female bank employees envy intensively the person they 
perceive  to  be very  similar  to  themselves,  i.e.  having  the  same  job  aspiration  and,  occupying  a 
relatively  similar  job  position.
13  Besides and as mentioned previously, for envy to arise, social 
comparisons must  concern  self -relevant  attributes,  i.e.  goods  or  domains  that  embody  so me 
personal importance to the envier’s eyes (Schaubroeck and Lam, 2004; Silver and Sabini, 1978). Again 
Schaubroeck and Lam (2004) indicate that female bank employees experience envy toward their 
female colleagues because they consider that their situation and job aspiration are identical and they 
attach much importance to these elements. More recently Hill and Buss (2006 ) also emphasize the 
importance of similarity and self-relevance in envy. Participants are asked to describe 7 personal 
situations  in  which  they  experience  envy  toward  another  person.  Participants  must  specify  the 
nature of the rival (e.g. coworker, neighbour, romantic partner, friend…) and also the nature of the 
desired attribute. Hill and Buss (2006) observe that both men and women indicate that they envy 
most often persons with whom they are similar and in direct competition for resources. Indeed more 
than half of men and women reveal that most episodes of envy are directed toward same-sexed 
friends. The authors also investigate which attributes are self-relevant and whether there are gender 
differences. Hill and Buss (2006) give to subjects a list including four items : sexual experience, rival’s 
attractiveness, romantic partner’s attractiveness and gifts received from one’s romantic partner. The 
authors ask subjects to rank all items in order to indicate to what degree each item would cause 
them envy using likert scales ranging from 1 (item that causes the most envy) to 19 (item that causes 
the least envy). Concerning differences between men and women, the authors observe that the 
object  of  envious  feelings  concerns  different  attributes.  Men’s  envy  is  more  directed  at  sexual 
experience than women (i.e. men dislike having an inferior sexual experience than other men) and 
                                                           
12 See also Fox et al. (1989). 
13 They capture employees’ envy by using the Dispositional Envy Scale (DES) elaborated by Smith et al. (1999). 




that women are more concerned by the physical attractiveness of their potential rivals (i.e. women 
dislike being less beautiful than their same-sexed friends).
14 
b.  The affective components of envy 
 
When  referring  to  envy,  scholars  (whether  psychologists  or  not)  typically  claim  that  envy  is  an 
unpleasant emotion. To express this unpleasant aspect of envy, psychologists usually label envy with 
terms such as discontent, ill-will, longing and sense of inferiority (Farber, 1966; Foster, 1972; Salovey 
and Rodin, 1984; Silver and Sabini, 1978). There are few experiments aiming at picturing envy from a 
qualitative perspective. 
Among the first qualitative picture of envy, we can quote the study by Smith et al. (1988) that tries to 
shed light on the existence of a linguistic confusion between envy and jealousy. Smith et al. (1988) 
ask subjects to distinguish the affective components of an episode of envy from those characteristics 
of jealousy.
15 The authors ask subjects to describe a situation in which they personally felt strong 
envy.
16 Then they receive a list of affective states (e.g. suspiciousness, spite, sadness...) and have to 
indicate for each feeling whether the feeling is characteristic of an episode of strong envy or strong 
jealousy. Smith et al. (1988) convey a linguistic confusion between envy and jealousy: people use 
these terms as if they were interchangeable. The authors explain that confusion by the broader sense 
of the term jealousy: when subjects are asked to report first an episode of jealousy and then of envy, 
they confound more often these emotional episodes (i.e. subjects’ description of envious situations 
fits less with the definition of envy adopted by the authors). Besides subjects report that envious 
                                                           
14  Hill  and  Buss  (2006)  refer  to  evolutionary  psychology  so  as  to  explain  their  results.  They  consider  that 
“individuals  continually  struggle  to  acquire  fitness-relevant  resources  or  positions  that  others  are 
simultaneously  attempting  to  acquire”  (2008,  p.  60).  Women  aim  at  securing  a  partner  who  possess  the 
capacities to invest in themselves and in their offspring. Then women compete more on their potential mate 
and give much importance to physical attractiveness. Men aim at obtaining benefits from their mate choices. 
They compete in sexual access to young, healthy and fertile women.  
15 In this paper we do not aim at differentiating envy from jealousy (see  Salovey and Rodin, 1984; Silver and 
Sabini, 1978; Smith et al., 1988). Whereas envy is a dyadic emotion, jealousy involves three parties: the jealous 
(i.e. the subject), the jealous’ target (i.e. the rival) and the object of jealousy (i.e. the beloved). In jealousy, the 
subject believes that the beloved is at his own disposal or that he maintains a relationship (whether real or 
virtual) with the latter. The subject perceives a threat to his relationship with the beloved and is frightened by 
loosing this valorised relationship to the rival. Jealousy is focused on the fear to lose a valorised relationship to 
the rival whereas envy focuses on the rival’s situation that possesses an attribute the subject lacks. 
16 The authors implement different conditions in order to fulfil their objective. In one condition, subjects are 
asked to describe first a situation of strong  envy and then of strong jealousy. In the other condition, subjects 
make the opposite procedure (first jealousy then envy). As we want to isolate the affective components of 
envious episodes, we focus on the results they obtain about envy. Note that authors  restrain their analyses to 
episodes of envy reported by subjects that conforms with the definition of envy given by the  Oxford English 
Dictionnary  (i.e.  feelings  of  discontent  and/or  ill-will  that  arise  when  personal  qualities,  possessions,  or 




episodes  are  characterized  by  feelings  of  inferiority,  a  motivation  to  improve,  longing  for  what 
another possesses, wishfulness, self-criticism, dissatisfaction and self-awareness. Some items were 
considered, from subjects’ point of view, as relevant to both envy and jealousy: sadness, frustration, 
unlucky and helplessness. 
Parrott and Smith (1993) use a similar experiment in order to disentangle the intensity and the 
nature of the affective components between the emotions of envy and jealousy. The authors believe 
that the greater intensity of jealousy can mask any qualitative difference between the emotions of 
envy and jealousy. Their experiment consists in two distinct parts. First they ask subjects to relate a 
situation in which they experience either strong envy or jealousy and to rate different items on likert 
scales. Items are about affective states related to these emotional episodes (e.g. suspiciousness, ill-
will…). When observing the relative salience of distinct affective states, the authors observe that 
jealousy  is  experienced  more  intensively  than  envy  in  almost  all  affective  elements.  Through  a 
second  analysis  with  adjusted  scores,  the  authors  note  that  jealousy  and  envy  are  qualitatively 
different:  some  affective  states  are  more  salient  in  envy  than  in  jealousy.
17  Indeed  envy  is 
characterized by disapproval, longin g for what another possesses, a motivation to improve and 
degradation.  In  the  second  part  of  the  experiment,  the  authors  ask  subjects  to  rate  stories 
independently. Two sets of stories are implemented. The stories place two characters in interaction: 
the protagonist and the rival. By changing the success and the characteristics of both the protagonist 
and the rival, the authors can create a situation in which either envy or jealousy is prone to arise. 
Envy is created when the rival succeeds whereas the prot agonist fails or do not reach the same 
success as the rival. After reading the stories, subjects have to rate different affective states items 
using likert scales in order to indicate how they believe the protagonist would feel at the end of the 
story. Parrott and Smith (1993) observe that three items are significantly related to envy: inferiority, 
resentment and longing for what another possesses.  
These  studies  convey  that  envy  is  a  complex  emotion.  Conversely  to  “primary”  emotions  (e.g. 
emotions universally recognizable such as sadness, joy, disgust, anger, fear, surprise and pride), envy 
is difficult to recognize and analyze. An episode characteristic of envy can be sketched as a mixture of 
different affective elements such as inferiority, longing for what others possess and a subjective 
sense of injustice. All these elements signal the existence of a depressive dimension in envy (e.g. 
inferiority, longing, resentment…). Note that not every episode of envy requires to gather all these 
elements that confers to envy a protean character (Farber, 1966).  The protean character of envy is 
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strengthened by the fact that the action resulting from envious feelings (or the hostility included in 
envy) can be expressed through a variety of forms (see the next section). 
c.  Envy and hostility 
 
Envy is often considered as an emotion imbued with hostility: the emotion is often held responsible 
for leading to violent acts and aggressions. Schoeck (1969) provides various examples of violent 
crimes motivated by envy toward the beauty or physical aptitudes of someone. The violent mugger 
of Rose Watterson by her former roommate, Patricia Dennis, perfectly illustrates the hostile impulse 
of envy. The murderer, after being arrested, immediately confessed to be envious of her former 
roommate. Patricia Dennis was so envious of Rose’s beauty that she attacked the latter by using a 
hatchet. Rose was severely injured and remained disfigured. Glick (2002)  outlines the role of envy in 
the anti-Semitism wave exhibited in Nazi Germany. As them, many psychologists study the hostile 
aspect included in envy.  
Silver and Sabini (1978) aim at evaluating the perception of envy by individuals and implement an 
experiment based on videotapes. In their experiment subjects are asked to watch a videotape about 
an  interaction  between  two  students.  One  of  these  students  (the  rival)  just  learns  that  he  was 
accepted  to  a  prestigious  school  whereas  the  other  student  (the  protagonist  representing  the 
envious) reacts to this news. The latter reactions differ from treatments. Silver and Sabini (1978) 
implement different treatments in order to investigate if the definition of envy relies on different 
contexts such as the relation between the protagonist and the rival (i.e. friends or stranger), the 
reaction of the protagonist (i.e. praises or teases), the difference of success between the envious 
student and the rival… Hence in one version of the videotape, the protagonist is accepted to a lower 
prestigious school, in another version in a equally prestigious school and in one version the envious 
student reacted in a arrogant way exhibiting hostility toward the rival… Subjects are asked to watch 
only one version of the videotape and after viewing it they have to report if the envious student 
exhibited envy or not toward the rival.  Silver and Sabini (1978) observe that when the envious 
student  reacts  by  exhibiting  some  hostility  toward  the  good  news  of  the  rival,  the  majority  of 
subjects (58,6%) reports that the envious student is experiencing envy toward the rival. Hence the 
authors conclude that most people consider envy as a hostile attitude in front of one’s success.  
More recently, Parrott and Rodriguez Mosquera (2008) report similar results. The authors distribute 
a questionnaire to samples of college students (in US, Netherlands and Spain). The questionnaire 




they believed to be) the target of other’s envy. After reporting such experiences they have to give 
additional details (about what they were envied, how the enviers behave...). A striking result is that 
most stories about being envied reveal that the envier exhibited some hostility toward the envied. 
The majority of subjects reports to be envied through a hostile form. The hostility of the envier is 
reported  through  a  variety  of  form  (e.g.  from  nasty  looks  and  sarcastic  comments  to  physical 
aggression).  
Why envy includes such hostility?  Beck (1999) considers that hostility is a common and natural 
answer when someone is placed in a situation of inferiority. Indeed unfavourable social comparisons 
are  considered  as  a  threat  to  one  self-image  and  self-evaluation.  When  observing  one’s  own 
inferiority, negative feelings are expected to arise such as depression, lack of self-confidence, low 
self-esteem. All these elements might damage one’s self-evaluation and are likely to generate hostile 
reactions. In that case hostile reactions are considered as a form of protection against a threat. If one 
is caught in a situation revealing his own inferiority he is likely to exhibit aggressive and violent 
behaviour (Schoeck, 1969). Those negative comparisons are expected to trigger negative feelings like 
frustration,  inferiority  and  even  anger.  Moreover  these  negative  feelings  are  prone  to  exert 
aggressive behaviour (Berkowitz, 1989; 1990). Smith and Kim (2007) offer three explanations to the 
hostile attitude included in envy. The hostility can be explained by feelings of frustration (generated 
by the inferior situation), shame (triggered by the experience of feelings socially condemned) and can 
represent an adaptative reaction to increase one’s situation (e.g. hostility may be considered as 
reinforcing the inducement to put an end to one’s inferiority). Besides several studies indicate that 
frustration states can drive to hostile behaviours and actions (Berkowitz, 1989, 1990; Rule et al., 
1978; Kulik and Brown, 1979). 
Is envy always hostile? Although envy is considered by individuals as hostile, psychologists point out 
that  some episodes of  envy  include  hostility  whereas  others  no. Psychologists  did  not  reach  an 
agreement on the nature of envy. In order to explain why envy sometimes includes a negative action 
and sometimes not, psychologists made a distinction between “envy proper” (“invidious envy” or 
“invidentia”) and “benign envy” (“admiring envy”).  Whereas the former form of envy involves a 
desire that the rival loses the desired attribute the latter form of envy does not. Smith and Kim 
(2007) add about “benign envy” that: “benign envy is envy sanitized (...) and lacks a core ingredient of 
the emotion, namely some form of ill-will” (p. 47). 
Psychologists  are  interested  in  understanding  why  some  envious  feelings  induce  the  subject  to 
undertake negative actions whereas others no. They identify two key elements that could turn envy 




Perceived injustice (or subjective injustice) can explain why some envious episodes are characterized 
by  hostility  whereas  others  no.  Smith  et  al.  (1994)  investigate  whether  inferiority  or  subjective 
injustice  could  drive  to  hostility.  More  precisely  the  authors  try  to  disentangle  the  impact  of 
inferiority and subjective sense of injustice on subjects’ reactions.
18 They ask subjects to relate a 
personal situation in which they experience intense envy. Then subjects are invited to rate several 
distinct items that focus on the conditions that might generate their envy, on affective states they 
experienced  and  on  reactions  toward  the  envied.  Smith  et  al.  (1994)  observe  that  feelings  of 
inferiority (without subjective feelings whether the inferiority is deserved or not) induce the subject 
to focus on his own inferiority. As a consequence feelings of inferiority drive to depressive feelings 
rather than to hostility. On the other hand, if the subject is placed in a situation of inferiority and if 
he  believes  that  the  rival’s  advantage  is  undeserved  then  the  subject  is  likely  to  experience 
depressive feelings and to exhibit hostility toward the rival.
19 With regard to their results, Smith et al. 
(1994) conclude that envy is a mixture of both depressive and hostile feelings.  
Another key point concerning the connection betwe en envy and hostility relies on the perceived 
possibility or not for the subject to obtain the desired attribute. According to scholars ( Cohen-
Charash et al, 2008; Lockwood and Kunda, 1997; Major et al., 1991; Testa and Major, 1990; Vecchio, 
1995; van Yperen et al., 2006) it sounds like “envy proper” is likely to appear in situations in which 
the subject has no control over the desired attribute, i.e. the desired attribute is out of range the 
subject’s possibility. On the opposite, when the desired attribute is likely to be obtained by the 
subject  then  “benign  envy”  or  emulation  are  prone  to  arise.  The  notion  of  “perceived  control” 
captures  the  perceived  possibility  for  the  subject  to  obtain  or  not  the  desired  attribute.  The 
perceived control is determined by the subject’s expectations regarding the stability of the situation 
and by the expectations of the subject regarding his ability(ies) to change the situation. Different 
theories and psychological models are based on the notion of perceived control so as to predict the 
action and affective states resulting from envious episodes (Major et al, 1991; Cohen-Charash et al., 
2008). When a situation is perceived as changeable and when the subject believes he possesses the 
abilities required to change the situation then the perceived control is high and the action resulting 
from envious feelings is ought to be constructive. On the other hand when the subject perceives the 
situation as unlikely to change and possesses pessimistic beliefs about his capacity to change the 
situation then the perceived control is low. In that case, the subject consumed by envy is likely to 
engage in destructive behaviour (i.e. harming the other, sabotage…). We can also point out another 
                                                           
18 In their study, only two aspects of subjects’ reactions are investigated: depression and hostility. 
19 The authors refer to the subjective sense of injustice rather to injustice proper  (i.e. object of resentment). 
Although there are several examples of envious persons claiming that their situation is undeserved, such claims 




possible situation: when the subject perceives the situation as changeable but does not believe he 
can change the situation (or when the subject perceives the situation as unlikely to change but 
believes he possesses the abilities to change the situation). In that latter case, the perceived control 
is intermediate and envy pushes the subject to withdraw from the existing situation (i.e. change job, 
move to another neighbourhood…). Table 1 summarizes the correlation between perceived control 
and envious reactions based on the model of Cohen-Charash et al. (2008).  
INSERT TABLE 1 
Table 1: Model of perceived control of Cohen-Charash et al. (2008) and reactions to envy. 
  Perceived changeability of situation 











































High  Self-directed  responses  (e.g.  improving 
position  of  self,  positive  emotions  and 
cognitions 
 
Dimension-focused  reactions  (e.g. 
withdrawing  from  situation,  cognitively 
changing  situation,  emotional  and 
cognitive reactions) 
Low  Comparison-other  directed  responses 
(e.g.  harming  the  other,  negative 
emotions and cognitions) 
 
Testa and Major (1990) explore that issue through an experiment. After performing a task, subjects 
are informed that they performed poorly. They are also informed of other participants’ performance. 
Whereas some subjects are exposed to better performing individuals (upward social comparison), 
others are exposed to poor performing individuals (downward social comparison). Then the authors 
invite subjects to participate to an additional task. Some subjects are told that whereas they failed 
during the first task they could improve their performance at the second task (high control condition) 
whereas other could not (low control condition). After participating to the second task, subjects are 
then  asked  to  report  their  subjective  feelings.
20  Testa and Major (1990)   observe that subjects 
exposed to upward social comparisons and participating in the low control condition report the 
highest levels of depression and hostility. In another experiment  Lockwood and Kunda (1997) also 
emphasize on the importance of perceived control. They reveal  that the perception of control over 
the  desired  attribute  predicts  whether  unfavourable  social  comparisons  (i.e.  upward  social 
comparisons) affect negatively one’s self-evaluation. In their study, 1
st year undergraduates receive 
information concerning some other student (referent student afterwards) who performs well in a 
                                                           




self-relevant domain. The referent student is either a 1
st year undergraduate (i.e. students of the 
same level) or a 4
th year undergraduate. Comparisons with the 1
st year undergraduate rival are 
expected to damage one’s self-image whereas comparisons with the 4
th year undergraduate rival are 
expected to induce the subject to make additional efforts. The authors ask participants to report 
their beliefs about their own abilities. The authors observe that participants having optimistic beliefs 
about  their  own  abilities  find  upward  social  comparisons  to  embody  some  emulative  value. 
Conversely, subjects having pessimistic and fixed beliefs about their own abilities do not find any 
emulative aspect in upward social comparisons. Finally Cohen-Charash et al. (2008) also investigate 
that issue. They recruit employed participants and ask them to complete a questionnaire about their 
envy experiences at work.
21 The questionnaire aims at examining the changeability of the situation 
and  the  person’s  perceived  ability  to  change  it.  The  authors  observe  that  in  presence  of  low 
perceived  control  (i.e.  the  situation  is  perceived  as  unchangeable),  81%  of  subjects  experience 
negative feelings and 52% engage in destructive actions. On the other hand when the situation is 
perceived as changeable and the subject believes he can change it (high perceived control), 67% of 
subjects indicate that they engage in constructive actions. But in the same time 58% of subjects 
signal that they also engage in destructive actions in such situations. Cohen-Charash et al. (2008) find 
mixed evidences concerning the impact of perceived control on the action resulting from envious 
feelings. 
Evolutionary  psychology  also  suggests  the  importance  of  perceived  control  in  the  envy  process. 
Evolutionary psychology is a new branch of psychology that refers to adaptation and evolution so as 
to explain  psychological  traits  and  considers  individuals  as  the  functional  products of  natural or 
sexual selection. Evolutionary psychology states that human behaviour is generated by universal 
psychological adaptations that evolved in order to solve recurrent problems in human environments. 
Relying on evolutionary psychology, Hill and Buss (2008) state that the key parameter which will 
decide the direction of envy (whether emulative or destructive) is the environment in which the 
subject and the rival interacts. Indeed they argue that the behavioural impact of envy depends on 
what are the strategies available given personal and environmental constraints. The environment 
determines what are the options (i.e. strategies) at the subject’s disposal and also underlines what 
are the optimal solutions from the subject’s perspective. Hence envy would not exert the subject to 
engage in an action if it forms part of a strategy that is not optimal for the subject. If the environment 
favours  efforts  (by  promoting  images  of  self-accomplished  persons,  by  favouring  individual 
mobility...) or does not allow negative attitudes (by establishing social norms or legislating) then the 
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subject consumed by envy might be more pushed to make additional efforts so as to get out from his 
relative inferiority and to put an end to his painful envy. On the other side, if the environment does 
not favours efforts or facilitates negative behaviour (by lack of social norms, lack of opportunity to 
mobility), envy is more prone to exert the subject to harm the rivals and to remove the desired 
attribute  from  the  latter’s  hands.  Hill  and  Buss  (2008)  precise  :  “(…)  the  behavioural  strategies 
motivated  by  envy  should  vary  depending  on what  behavioural  strategy  or set  of  strategies  are 
optimal given personal and environmental constraints. (...)The optimal behavioral strategy that envy 
will likely motivate in response to such an advantage depends on the costs and benefits associated 
with  each.”  (p.  66).  Imagine  agent  A  working  in  a  company.  He  learns  that  his  colleague  get 
promoted. Envy arises in him. What are the possible options at agent A’s disposal? We can roughly 
distinguish three options. First agent A can opt to work harder. Alternatively agent A can choose to 
quit  the  company  for  another  one.  Finally,  agent  A  can  choose  to  damage  the  situation  of  his 
colleague  or  to  deter  the  latter’s  performance  through  sabotage  acts  or  through  withholding 
information. For Hill and Buss (2008), agent A will select the optimal strategy. The optimal strategy 
depends on the cost and benefits associated with the strategy. Considering that agent A works in an 
European company, he will surely work harder since this strategy constitutes the best one to increase 
the likelihood of catching the manager’s attention and obtaining a promotion. Conversely, if we 
consider that agent A works in a small company located in an underdeveloped country, the optimal 
strategy will consist in damaging the rival’s situation and destroying his attributes. Indeed in such 
setting, the likelihood of getting promoted or obtaining the resources required for, at least, matching 
the rival’s advantage are scarce. This suggests that the individual has some conscious control on his 
envy.  
Then it sounds like the hostile aspect of envy appears in specific situations. Indeed as not every 
unflattering  social  comparison  generates  envy,  not  every  envious  feeling  induces  the  subject  to 
exhibit hostility toward the rival. Two key elements have been identified in the envy process: the 
perceived control and the subjective sense of inferiority. Envy involves hostility when the desired 
attribute is out of range from the envier’s possibility and when the envier personally believes that 
the rival’s better situation is unfair.  
d.  Partial conclusion 
 
In this section, we refer to psychological researches on envy so as to sketch envy from a qualitative 
perspective. One important point about psychological researches is the experimental approach they 




between different situations in which envy is prone to arise. They can also examine the impact of the 
relationship between the subject and the rival (e.g. friendship, rivalry…) on the experience of envy or 
study to what extent envy has a depressive effect on the subject and when envy can have a positive 
impact both from an affective and behavioural perspective on the subject.  
In line with philosophers, envy stems from social comparisons. More precisely, envy arises from 
every unflattering social comparison that threatens one’s self-evaluation and thus self-esteem. Social 
comparisons are used so as to form one’s self-evaluation. So any social comparison that can alter 
self-evaluation  may  generate  envy.  In  order  to  impact  significantly  one’s  self-evaluation  social 
comparisons have to concern self-relevant attributes or traits, i.e. material or immaterial goods for 
which the subject attach much importance. For example, an athlete that won a bronze medal in 
swimming is not ought to envy an athlete that won the gold medal in athletics. Although both are 
athletes,  they  are  interested  in  being  the  best  in  their  respective  domains:  social  comparisons 
concern not self-relevant attributes. Conversely the bronze medal swimmer is very likely to envy the 
gold medal swimmer. In that latter case social comparison focuses on a self-relevant attribute and is 
ought to damage the bronze medal swimmer’s self-evaluation. Again psychologists emphasizes on 
the necessary condition that social comparisons, in spite of concerning self-relevant attributes, have 
to concern similar subjects in order to generate envy. Similarity also modulates the impact and self-
relevance of social comparisons. When social comparisons concern similar subjects, they are more 
likely to affect (whether positively or negatively) one’s self-evaluation because similar persons are 
likely  to  possess  similar  aspirations,  objectives  and  to  share  self-relevant  attributes.  Thus  social 
comparisons between similar subjects are more prone to trigger envious feelings when leading to an 
unfavourable diagnostic.  
Envy is an unpleasant experience. Envious episodes are labeled with terms such as dissatisfaction, 
disapproval, longing and desire to improve. By asking subjects to indicate how they feel when they 
experience  envy,  psychologists  are  able  to  distinguish  two  main  affective  components  in  envy: 
depression and hostility. The depressive component is associated with the experiential consequences 
resulting from unflattering social comparisons, i.e. feelings of inferiority, ill-will and dissatisfaction. 
The hostile component refers to the action tendency associated with the emotion.  
Psychologists offer new insights to understand the action resulting from envious behaviours. They 
distinguish two forms of envy: one form includes the desire to remove the desired attribute from the 
rival’s hands (“envy proper”) whereas the other no (“envy benign”). They acknowledge that hostility 
is deeply rooted in envy. Nevertheless, albeit hostility is inherent in envy, psychologists point out that 




the hostility included in envy can take miscellaneous forms. Referring on experimental procedures, 
psychologists  observe  that  the  hostility  included  in  envy  is  modulated  by  two  parameters:  the 
perceived injustice and perceived control. When the subject believes his situation to be the result of 
unfair decisions he is more likely to exhibit hostility toward the rival. Besides when the subject 
believes he can improve his situation and he possess the ability(ies) required to improve his situation, 
then envy is ought to push the subject to engage in constructive rather than in destructive efforts.   
To conclude, psychologists sketch envy as an unpleasant experience arising from the awareness of 
another’s advantage one lacks and characterized by feelings of inferiority, hostility and longing. They 
define envy as made of two main components: depression and hostility. The depressive component 
refers to the unpleasant experience of envy and associates envy with feelings of inferiority, ill-will, 
dissatisfaction  or  longing.  The  hostility  component  refers  to  the  action  resulting  from  envious 
feelings. Psychologists convey that the hostility inherent in envy can be expressed through a variety 
of forms and that perceived injustice and control modulates the expression of the hostility.  
Relying  on  previous  researches,  Smith  et  al.  (1999)  build  a  device  so  as  to  elicit  envy  or  more 
precisely to assess the tendency to feel envy. They create a group of candidate items (54 items at the 
beginning) and ask subjects to rate on a likert scale each item.
22 Candidate items represent the two 
main affective components of envy: the depressive and hostile components (see Appendix). Smith et 
al (1999) remove some variables that do not satisfy different criteria (authors retain items loading 
0.60 and higher on the first unrotated factor, eliminate re dundant items or items that are overly 
specific in terms of the envied object). Finally Smith et al. (1999) retain eight items in order to form 
the Dispositional Envy Scale (DES afterwards). A version of the DES is supplied in Table 2.  Two items 
capture the tendency to feel inferior when observing others’ success (items 2 and 6). One item 
represents the tendency to feel frustrated at the sight of others’ advantages (item 4). Two items 
represent feelings of injustice created by another person’s advantage (items 7 and 8). Finally, Three 
items catch the frequency of envy (items 1, 3 and 5), its controllability (item 5) and its consistent 
intensity  (item  3).  The  DES  does  not  measure  the  envy  experienced  by  a  subject  but  the 
predisposition to experience envy when exposed to an unfavourable social comparison.  
Insert Table 2 
 
                                                           








1  I feel envy every day 
2  The bitter truth is that I generally feel inferior to others 
3  Feelings of envy constantly torment me 
4  It is so frustrating to see some people succeed so easily 
5  No matter what I do, envy always plague me 
6  I am troubled by feelings of inadequacy 
7  It somehow doesn’t seem fair that some people seem to have all the talent 
8  Frankly, the success of my neighbours makes me resent them 
 
4. Final Conclusion 
 
In this paper we explore the emotion of envy and provide a description of the emotion through 
referring both on philosophical and psychological researches on envy. Thanks to this paper we define 
elements that can help economists to identify and capture envy. Envy is a social emotion, i.e. an 
emotion arising from social comparisons. Envy stems from unfavourable social comparisons that 
damage  individual  self-evaluation  and  self-esteem.  To  affect  individual  self-evaluation  and  self-
esteem, social comparisons have to concern self-relevant attributes, i.e. goods or domains that are 
relevant to determining and evaluating self-evaluation, and to concern similar and not too distant 
individuals, i.e. individuals sharing similar characteristics. The emotion can be roughly defined using 
two dimensions: depression and hostility. The depression dimension refers to the unpleasant and 
often painful experience of envy: envy can be sketched as a form of painful sadness at the sight of 
others’  advantages.  The  depression  dimension  included  in  envy  may  be  considered  as  the 
consequence of the relative inferiority of the agent, i.e. the source of envy. An episode of envy is 
made of distinct affective states: feelings of inferiority, ill-will and longing. The hostility dimension 
captures the action tendency of the emotion. Envy exerts the subject to engage in hostile behaviour 
toward the rival. The hostility inherent in envy can be expressed through a variety of forms and is 
modulated by two key parameters: perceived control and perceived injustice. The perceived control 
refers to the subjective belief that the agent possesses the ability to improve his situation. If the 
agent possesses a low perceived control, i.e. has pessimistic beliefs relative to its possibilities and 
capacities  to  improve  his  situation  then  he  is  more  likely  to  engage  in  an  hostile  behaviour. 




abilities required to improve his situation then the agent is more likely to make additional efforts and 
the hostility inherent in envy is unexpressed (or at least will not be intense). The perceived injustice 
catches whether the subject perceives his situation as unfair or not. When the subject perceives his 
situation as unfair, the latter is more likely to exhibit hostile reactions. Envy is also modulated by the 
gap between the subject and the rival. The correlation between the intensity of envy and the subject-
object distance can be pictured as a bellshaped curve. Indeed the intensity of envy depends on 
whether the subject compares himself with members from his reference group or outside from his 
reference group. The correlation between the emotional intensity of envy and the subject-object gap 
is positive concerning social comparisons with members from his reference group and negative with 
members located outside from his reference group. In this paper, we also discuss whether envy 
includes  equality  concerns  and  how  to  disentangle  envy  from  resentment.  Finally  envy  can  be 
defined as an unpleasant emotion arising from any unfavourable social comparison that potentially 
affects negatively individual self-evaluation, characterised by a dissatisfaction (or more generally by 
depressive  reactions)  at  the  awareness  of  others’  relatively  higher  situation  and  position  and 
including hostility (that can be expressed through a variety of forms).  
How can economists identify and capture envy? Through this paper we point out three elements that 
can be used within economic analyses to identify envy and explore its consequences. First, as envy 
arises from every unfavourable social comparison that affects negatively individual self-evaluation 
and self-esteem, one can observe the impact of unflattering social comparisons on individual self-
evaluation and self-esteem. If social comparison damages individual self-evaluation and self-esteem 
then envy is prone to arise. Although evaluating individual self-esteem and self-evaluation is made 
possible  using  reliable  devices  (Rosenberg,  1965;  1979;  1985),  observing  the  impact  of  social 
comparisons  on  the  latter  is  more  difficult.  Then  as  envy  consists  of  two  affective  components 
(hostility  and  depression),  one  can  easily  evaluate  these  two  dimensions  so  as  to  observe  the 
intensity and action tendency of envy. Nevertheless by evaluating subjects’ depressive and hostile 
reactions, it is difficult to argue that one can identify envy. In line with envy many social emotions are 
made of depressive and hostile reactions (e.g. shame, jealousy…). Finally one simple way to identify 
envy would consist in evaluating the satisfaction subjects’ derive from observing others’ relative 
successes or advantages. If a subject indicates to be dissatisfied at learning others’ successes or 
advantages  he  is  ought  to  experience  envy.  The  advantage  of  this  method  is  that  evaluating 
individual satisfaction is relatively easy and the devices implemented for that issue are acknowledged 
to be reliable. But again this measure would include some limits: how to disentangle envy from 
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